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Fitzgerald v. Greene
150 F.3d 357 (4th Cir. 1998)
I. Facts
On January 29, 1993, at approximately 6:00 a.m., thirteen year-old Claudia
White was awakened by the sound of Ronald Lee Fitzgerald entering her home.'
Shortly thereafter, Fitzgerald saw Coy White, Claudia's father, drive into the
driveway.2 When White entered the front door, he saw Fitzgerald and demanded
to know what he was doing with his daughter.3 Fitzgerald told White to get on
the floor.4 As White was doing so, Fitzgerald shot him in the neck, severing
White's spinal cord and killing him.5 Fitzgerald then pointed the gun at Claudia
and ordered her to get her father's wallet and car keys.6 Claudia complied.7
Fitzgerald took her to a rural location and raped her. 8
At approximately 7:45 a.m. the same morning, Fitzgerald hailed a taxicab
driven by Hugh Morrison in which Kathryn Davis was a passenger.9 Davis
testified that Morrison drove off with Fitzgerald after she arrived at her destina-
tion.'0 Douglas Shelton discovered Morrison's body in a nearby creek later that
morning. "
Fitzgerald next appeared at Tiffany Lovelace's home driving a taxicab. 2
Fitzgerald took Lovelace and her children to a motel in Altavista, Virginia where
he raped her. 3 Fitzgerald then asked Sonya and John Covington, guests of the
motel, for a ride. 4 The couple agreed and took Fitzgerald, Lovelace, and her
children to Lovelace's home." Lovelace and the children got out of the car, but
Fitzgerald asked the Covingtons to take him to the courthouse. 6 When Fitzger-
ald and the Covingtons arrived at the courthouse, Fitzgerald pointed a gun into
his mouth and pulled the trigger. 7 The gun malfunctioned, however, and failed
1. Fitzgerald v. Greene, 150 F.3d 357, 360 (4th Cir. 1998).

















to fire.'" Sonya jumped out of the car, and John took the gun from Fitzgerald. 9
Shortly thereafter, the police apprehended Fitzgerald.'
On January 29, 1994 a Virginia jury found Ronald Lee Fitzgerald guilty of
murdering Coy White during the commission of a robbery, murdering Hugh
Morrison during the commission of a robbery, abducting and raping thirteen
year-old Claudia White, abducting and raping Tiffany Lovelace, and breaking and
entering into Coy White's residence.2 In the penalty phase of the bifurcated
proceeding, the jury recommended Fitzgerald be sentenced to death for the
murders of Coy White and Morrison due both to his future dangerousness to the
community and the vileness of his crimes.2 On May 10, 1994, the trial court
imposed a sentence of death.' On March 3, 1995, Fitzgerald's convictions and
sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court of Virginia.24 After exhausting his
state appeals, Fitzgerald petitioned the United States District Court for the
Western District of Virginia for a writ of habeas corpus.2" The District Court
denied the writ by an order dated November 20, 1997. 26 Fitzgerald appealed to
the Fourth Circuit.2
On appeal, Fitzgerald raised four claims: (1) that he was denied a fair and
impartial jury in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments; (2) that the
Commonwealth failed to provide exculpatory information as required by Brady
v. MaylandP and its progeny, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment; (3) that
the trial court failed to instruct the jury that he was parole ineligible in violation
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments; and (4) that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment.')
II. Holding
The court of appeals found all of Fitzgerald's claims to be defaulted or
without merit.
18. Fitzgerald, 150 F.3d at 361.
19. Id
20. Id
21. Id at 360.
22. Fitzgerald, 150 F.3d at 361.
23. Id at 360. The jury also recommended Fitzgerald be sentenced to: life imprisonment for
the two robberies and the abduction and rape of Claudia White; two forty-year sentences for the
abduction and rape of Lovelace; and a thirty-year sentence for the breaking and entering conviction.
The court adopted the jury's recommendations. Id at 360 n.1.
24. Id at 361. See Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 299, 455 S.E.2d 506 (1995), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1179 (1996).
25. Id
26. Fitgerald, 150 F.3d at 361.
27. Id
28. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
29. The court noted that because Fitzgerald filed his federal habeas petition after enactment
of the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death PenaltyAct of 1996,Pub.L. No. 104-132,110 Stat. 1214,
the AEDPA's more deferential standards of review applied to his claims. Fitqerald, 150 F.3d at 362.
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III. Anaysis/Application in Virginia
A. Juror Dishonesty
During voir dire, the trial court asked James Bradshaw if "[he] or any
member of [his] immediate family [had] been the victim of a rape, robbery, or
abduction?"3 Bradshaw answered in the negative." The court later asked him
if he knew of any reason that he could not give Fitzgerald a fair trial based solely
upon the evidence presented and the law. 2 Bradshaw agreed that he could render
a fair verdict. Bradshaw subsequently was seated on the jury.
33
While the jurors were considering the last of the non-capital offenses of
which Fitzgerald had been convicted, the abduction and rape of Tiffany Love-
lace, Bradshaw disclosed to the jury that he had no sympathy for rapists because
his granddaughter had been molested as a child. He then made a motion that the
jury impose a life sentence upon Fitzgerald for the rape of Tiffany Lovelace.'
The motion failed, and the jury imposed a forty-year sentence for the crime."
After the jury announced its verdict and sentences, but before the trial court
imposed its sentence, the jury foreman reported the Bradshaw incident to the
court.36 The trial court subsequently conducted a post-trial hearing at which both
counsel and the court questioned Bradshaw regarding his partiality. 37 At the con-
clusion of the hearing, the trial court denied Fitzgerald's motion for a mistrial.3
The right to an impartial jury derives from the Sixth Amendment's guaran-
tee that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury."39 This right is applicable to the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment.' The Supreme Court has held that due
process requires "a jury capable and willing to decide the case solely on the evi-
dence before it."
41
Fitzgerald argued thatJames Bradshaw's presence on his jury deprived him
of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury for two reasons.42 First, he
asserted that Bradshaw's failure to disclose certain relevant information during
voir dire denied him the opportunity to strike Bradshaw for cause.43 Second,
Fitzgerald contended that even if Bradshaw's voir dire responses were truthful,
30. Id at 363.
31. Id.
32. Id.




37. Fit!Merai, 150 F.3d at 361.
38. Id
39. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
40. Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961).
41. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 209 (1982).
42. Fizgerahi, 150 F.3d at 363-65.
43. Id at 363-64.
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Bradshaw's statement during sentencing deliberations that he had no sympathy
for a rapist demonstrated his bias against Fitzgerald." The Fourth Circuit
declined to grant relief on both counts.45 In order to prevail on a claim in which
juror dishonesty during voir dire is alleged, a petitioner must show. (1) a juror
failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire; and (2) a correct
response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause." The
Supreme Court of Virginia had found that Fitzgerald failed to prove the first
requirement, concluding Bradshaw "testified truthfully during the voir dire. No
one asked Bradshaw during voir dire whether his granddaughter had been
molested. Rather, he was asked whether any member of his immediate family
had been raped."47 The Fourth Circuit noted that under the federal rules it was
bound to consider the state court's finding that Bradshaw's responses during voir
dire were honest and factually accurate absent convincing evidence to the con-
trary.4" Accordingly, it declined to provide relief for Bradshaw's conduct during
voir dire.49
The court of appeals then turned to Fitzgerald's second claim, that Brad-
shaw's statement during sentencing deliberations was evidence of juror bias."
The court first noted that failure to satisfy the requirements of McDonough Power
Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood5 does not end the court's inquiry when a petitioner
asserts a Sixth Amendment claim challenging the partiality of a juror based on
additional circumstances occurring outside voir dire. 2 As Justice Blackmun
explained in his concurrence in McDonougz
regardless of whether a juror's answer is honest or dishonest, it remains
within a trial court's option, in determining whether a jury was biased, to
order a post-trial hearing at which the movant has the opportunity to demon-
strate actual bias, or in exceptional circumstances, that the facts are such that
bias is to be inferred. 3
In Smith v. Phiips54 the United States Supreme Court explained "the remedy
for allegations of jury partiality is a hearing in which the defendant has the
opportunity to prove actual bias."55 Pursuant to that mandate, the trial court
44. Id
45. Id at 366.
46. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984).
47. Fithgerahi, 150 F.3d at 364 (quoting Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 455 S.E.2d 506,511-12
(1995)).
48. Id (citing 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(e)(1)).
49. Id
50. Id
51. 464 U.S. 548 (1984).
52. Fitera4, 150 F.3d at 362-63.
53. Id at 363 (quoting McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548 (1984)
(Blackmun,J., concurring) (citing Coughlin v. Tailhook Ass'n, 112 F.3d 1052,1062 (9th Cir. 1997)
& Gonzales v. Thomas, 99 F.3d 978, 985 (10th Cir. 1996)).
54. 455 U.S. 209 (1982).
55. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209,215 (1982).
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afforded Fitzgerald such a hearing, during which Bradshaw stated that his grand-
daughter's molestation had no effect on his voting to convict or sentence Fitzger-
ald for any of his crimes. Because the Fourth Circuit was bound to defer to the
trial court's factual finding of no actual bias, Fitzgerald argued that under the
doctrine of "implied bias" the court could infer Bradshaw's bias as a matter of
law based on the record before it. 6
The court first noted thatJustice O'Connor explained in Smith v. Philjs that
"a revelation that the juror is an actual employee of the prosecuting agency, that
the juror is a close relative of one of the participants in the trial or the criminal
transaction, or that the juror was a witness or somehow involved in the criminal
transaction"51 were the types of "exceptional" and "extraordinary" situations that
might require a finding of implied bias.58 Finding neither Bradshaw nor anyone
in his family was personally connected to any of the parties in his case, the court
found no support for a presumption of bias. 9 In addition, the Fourth Circuit
questioned the viability of the implied bias doctrine,' and acknowledged the
extremely narrow window of circumstances in which it may offer relief: "The
doctrine of implied bias is limited in application to those extreme situations
where the relationship between a prospective juror and some aspect of the
litigation is such that it is highly unlikely that the average person could remain
impartial in his deliberations under the circumstances.""'
Furthermore, the court of appeals held that even if there were error, there
was no evidence it "'had substantial and injurious effect or influence in determin-
ing the... verdict,"'62 and as such was harmless.63 In conducting its harmless
error analysis, the court noted that at the time of Bradshaw's statement, the jury
had already voted to convict Fitzgerald on all counts and unanimously agreed to
recommend the death sentence for the murders of White and Morrison." The
court also noted that during the post-trial hearing Bradshaw stated that his
granddaughter's experience did not affect his voting to convict or sentence Fitz-
56. Fitgerald, 150 F.3d at 363-65 (citing Smith, 455 U.S. at 221 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(asserting that "implied bias" may also provide a basis for relief under certain circumstances);
United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123, 133 (1936) (explaining "[t]he bias of a prospective juror may
be actual or implied; that is, it may be bias in fact or bias conclusively presumed as matter of
law.")).
57. Id at 365 (citing Smith, 455 U.S. at 221, (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
58. Id (citing Smith, 455 U.S. at 221, (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
59. Id
60. Fit.gera/d, 150 F.3d at 365 (citing Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 664 (4th Cir.1988)
(questioning the viability of the implied bias doctrine); See also Tinsley v. Borg, 895 F.2d 520, 527
(9th Cir.1990) (acknowledging that "[t]he Supreme Court has never explicitly adopted or rejected
the doctrine of implied bias")).
61. Id (citing Person v. Miller, 854 F.2d 656, 664 (4th Cir.1988)).
62. Id (citing Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619 (1993) (quoting Kotteakos v. United
States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946))).
63. Id (citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. 227 (1954); Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209
(1982)).
64. Fitzgerald, 150 F.3d at 365.
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gerald. Based on these factors, the Fourth Circuit found Bradshaw's presence
on the jury did not result in actual prejudice to Fitzgerald," and as such he was
not entitled to habeas relief 7
In spite of the result in Fitzgerald, the case suggests that there is indeed a
narrow opportunity to challenge juror impartiality after the jury has been seated.
Of particular value in a given case may be the opportunity for an evidentiary
hearing. Counsel should not hesitate to seek time and resources necessary to
make such a hearing meaningful so that it serves as more than a vehicle for the
jurors' expected conclusory denials of bias.
B. Brady Claim
Fitzgerald next claimed the Commonwealth failed to provide exculpatory
information as required under Brady v. Magy1and" and its progeny. 9 Specifically,
Fitzgerald claimed the Commonwealth failed to disclose that Girard Younger, a
Commonwealth witness during both the guilt and sentencing phases, was a
convicted felon working as an informant for the Commonwealth in other
unrelated cases.7" Fitzgerald maintained this evidence could have been used to
impeach Younger.
71
On state habeas review, the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded that
Fitzgerald could have raised this issue on direct appeal, but failed to do so, and
therefore dismissed the claim as procedurally defaulted under Slayton v. Parigan.72
Absent a showing of cause and prejudice or a miscarriage of justice to excuse the
procedural default, the Fourth Circuit could not address the claim.73 Because
Fitzgerald did not attempt to demonstrate any such excuse, the Fourth Circuit
adopted the district court's finding that Fitzgerald's claim was procedurally
defaulted.74 Defense counsel should note that this does not in any way contradict
the rule that, under Kyks v. Whitly75 and Pyles v. Johnson,6 the defendant is clearly
entitled to information that a "jailhouse snitch" has a history as an informant in
other cases.
65. Id
66. Id (citing Brecht, 507 U.S. at 637 (holding that an error does not have a substantial and
injurious effect on a jury verdict unless "it resulted in 'actual prejudice"' to the habeas petitioner
(quoting United States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438, 449 (1986))).
67. Id
68. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
69. Fitrgerahi, 150 F.3d at 366.
70. Id
71. Id
72. Id (citing Slayton v. Parrigan, 215 Va. 27, 205 S.E.2d 680, 682 (1974)).
73. Fitgerahd, 150 F.3d at 366 (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 262 (1989)).
74. Id (citing Gilbert v. Moore, 134 F.3d 642,656 n. 10 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc), cert. denied,
119 S.Ct. 103 (1998).
75. 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
76. 136 F.3d 986 (5th Cir. 1998)(finding fact that jailhouse snitch has a history as an infor-
mant in other cases is within scope of Kyes).
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C. Denial of Proposed Jury Instruction
During the penalty phase of Fitzgerald's trial, defense counsel requested that
the following instruction be given to the jury:
The court instructs the jury that under Virginia law any person convicted of
three separate felony offenses of murder, rape or robbery by the presenting
of firearms or other deadly weapon or any combination of the offenses of
murder, rape or robbery when such offenses were not part of a common act,
transaction or scheme shall not be eligible for parole.'
The trial court denied the motion without determining if the murder of Coy
M. White and the rape and murder of Claudia Denise White constituted "a
common act, transaction, or scheme." Relying on Simmons v. South Carolina,78
which held that a state deprives a defendant in a capital case of due process if-it
"conceal[s] from the sentencing jury the true meaning of its noncapital sentenc-
ing alternative, namely, that life imprisonment mean[s] life without parole,,
79
Fitzgerald challenged the trial court's denial on direct appeal.' The Supreme
Court ofVirginia rejected Fitzgerald's claim, "concluding that (1) parole eligibility
in Virginia is a question of law to be determined by the judge, not the jury, and
(2) as a matter of law, Fitzgerald would have been eligible for parole because his
crimes were part of a common act.""1 As a result, the Supreme Court of Virginia
found Simmons inapplicable to the case.82 The Fourth Circuit found that the
Supreme Court of Virginia's decision was "neither contrary to nor an unreason-
able application of Simmons" and hence rejected Fitzgerald's claim.3
Although Virginia has now abolished parole and Fitzgerald has been exe-
cuted, it is worthwhile to take note of the erroneous resolution of this issue. The
issue, of course, was whether Fitzgerald's prior offenses were part of a common
transaction or scheme. It is disingenuous to hold that this was not a question of
fact for the jury. This is especially true considering that Va. Code Ann. 5 18.2-
31(7) refers to murder of more than one person in the same transaction. Had
Fitzgerald been charged under that section, the anomalous situation would have
been that the same term presented an issue of fact for the jury on the issue of
guilt but not on the crucial sentencing question. Further, even if the issue was
77. Fitrgera/d, 150 F.3d at 367. Virginia law, at the time of Fitzgerald's trial, provided as
follows:
Any person convicted of three separate felony offenses of (i) murder, (ni) rape or (ii)
robbery by the presenting of firearms or other deadly weapon, or any combination of
the offenses specified in subdivisions (i), (ii) or (ii) when such offenses were not part
of a common act, transaction or scheme shall not be eligible for parole.
VA.CODE ANN. § 53.1-151(B1) (Michie 1994).
78. 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
79. Fiteral4 150 F.3d at 367 (quoting Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154,162 (1994)).
80. Id
81. Id (citing Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 299, 455 S.E.2d 506, 510 (1995)).
82. Id
83. Fit~gerah, 150 F.3d at 367.
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question of law, it should have been determined by the trial judge with input
from the Commonwealth and defense, rather than by the Supreme Court of
Virginia.
D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Fitzgerald claimed that his trial counsel was deficient for failing to request
a competency examination after learning that Fitzgerald was "experiencing
suicidal ideation, delusional thought processes, and auditory hallucinations"
before trial.' The Fourth Circuit held that Fitzgerald's counsel was not deficient
in failing to move for an independent competency evaluation because: (1) Fitz-
gerald had in fact been evaluated for competency and sanity at the time of the
offense; s and (2) counsel stated that he decided that requesting another compe-
tency examination would be futile in light of the existing reports, that he found
Fitzgerald to be helpful and cooperative, and that Fitzgerald actively participated
in his own defense, particularly during jury selection. 6
Although the Fourth Circuit was probably correct in its interpretation of
Strickland v. Washington,"7 counsel should be very wary of accepting its advice.
Upon any indication of mental retardation, counsel should, for several reasons,
actively pursue any avenue which might yield evidence of such disability. First,
the rule of economy which dictates that counsel cannot be expected to pursue all
lines of evidentiary inquiry simply does not apply in a capital case because the
consequences of failing to do so are so much greater than anywhere else. Mental
retardation evidence in particular can be valuable because it helps to explain
irrational decisions and actions in times of stress and because it is a condition
that cannot be faked.8
84. Id at 368. Fitzgerald asserted he received constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel
because: (a) his trial counsel did not request a competency hearing; (b) his trial counsel did not fully
investigate and present mitigating evidence during the sentencing phase of the trial; and (c) his
appellate counsel failed "to raise valid issues on appeal." Idat 368-69. On state habeas review, the
Supreme Court of Virginia dismissed all Fitzgerald's ineffectiveness claims on the merits. Id at 368
(citing Fit4gerald, 455 S.E.2d at 510). The Fourth Circuit concluded the state court's decision was
not an unreasonable application of the test articulated by the United States Supreme Court in
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), to the facts presented. Under Strickland, a petitioner
must demonstrate both that his trial counsel's representation was deficient and that he was
prejudiced thereby. Fitzgerald, 150 F.3d at 368 (citing Stricklana 466 U.S. at 687).
85. Id These evaluations indicated Fitzgerald was borderline mentally retarded, but that he
understood the roles of the participants in the criminal trial process, was not insane, and was
competent to stand trial. Trial counsel also had Fitzgerald examined by Dr. Della Williams, a
neurosurgeon, to test for the presence of any organic brain injuries. She found no evidence of
injury. Id
86. Id
87. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
88. Fit.7erald, 150 F.3d at 368. Fitzgerald also argued his trial counsel was constitutionally
ineffective for failing to present mitigating witnesses during the sentencing phase of the trial. The
Fourth Circuit held that his counsel's decision not to present these witnesses was reasonable. First,
the court found that counsel was entitled to rely upon Dr. Ryan's assessment that Fitzgerald was
[Vol. 11: 1
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Fitzgerald also argued that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing
to brief a claim that Fitzgerald's sentence was excessive and disproportionate to
the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the defen-
dant. 9 Fitzgerald's attorneys stated in their brief that Fitzgerald "relies upon this
Court's expertise in conducting the automatic review of the sentences of death
imposed upon him which is required by Code § 17-110.1 of the Code of Virginia
of 1950, as amended, and chooses to make no argument relative to this assign-
ment of error."'  The Fourth Circuit held that counsel's strategic decision to
selectively brief and argue what, in his professional judgment, were Fitzgerald's
strongest claims did not render counsel constitutionally deficient under
Strickland.91 In addition, the Fourth Circuit found that Fitzgerald could not
demonstrate that his counsel's actions prejudiced him in any way.92 The court's
advice that it is acceptable to selectivity brief and argue issues should be ignored
in capital cases. It is impossible to tell which issues may later be found meritori-
ous and failure to brief and argue in Virginia constitutes default.93
E. Abuse of Discretion to Deny Motion For Evidentiay Hearing
Fitzgerald's final contention was that the district court abused its discretion
when it denied his motion for an evidentiary hearing.94 He claimed that he was
entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding his ineffective assistance of counsel
claims because he never received an evidentiary hearing in state court.9" The
Fourth Circuit cited precedent indicating that a defendant is entitled to an
evidentiary hearing "only if the state court fact-finding process was deficient in
sane and competent to stand trial and that therefore counsel's decision not to present additional
witnesses was not unreasonable. Second, the court noted that counsel's strategy to focus their case
on Fitzgerald's social and educational history, rather than his alleged mental problems in jail, was
credible and, therefore, should not be second-guessed. Idat 368-69 (citing Bunch v. Thompson, 949
F.2d 1354, 1364 (4th Cir. 1991) (recognizing that "[tihe best course for a federal habeas court is to
credit plausible strategic judgments" when evaluating ineffectiveness claims)).
89. Id at 369.
90. Id (quotingAppellant's Brief at 19, Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 455 S.E.2d 506 (1995)).
91. Id (citing Griffin v. Aiken, 775 F.2d 1226, 1235 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that "appellate
counsel has no constitutional duty to raise every nonfrivolous issue on appeal if counsel, as a matter
of professional judgment, decides not to raise such issue on appeal" (citingJones v. Barnes, 463 U.S.
745, 751-54 (1983)))).
92. FitZgerad, 150 F.3d at 369. The Fourth Circuit came to this conclusion after: (a) it
concluded the Virginia Supreme Court of Virginia conducted a thorough review of his case due to
his attorneys' decision to rely upon the court's mandatory review, rather than fully brief the issue;
and (b) even if the Virginia Supreme Court of Virginia had failed to conduct a proportionality
review, Fitzgerald would not be entitled to habeas relief. Id at 369 (citing Buchanan v. Angelone,
103 F.3d 344, 351 (4th Ci. 1996), cert. granted inpart and aft'd, 118 S.Ct. 757, (1998)).
93. Briefing and arguing constitutional issues which appeared likely to fail saved the lives of
the petitioners in both Simmons v. Soutb Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), and Skipper P. South Carofina,
476 U.S. 1(1986).
94. Fiterald, 150 F.3d at 369.
95. Id
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some significant respect. '96 Given this, the court of appeals concluded that just
because the state habeas court dismissed Fitzgerald's claims based upon affidavits
did not mean the proceeding was less than full and fair.97 Accordingly, the
Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's denial of an evidentiary hearing.9"
Douglas R. Banghart
96. Id (citing Eaton v. Angelone, 139 F.3d 990, 994 (4th Cir.), cet. denied, 118 S.Ct. 2338
(1998)).
97. Id
98. Filterald 150 F.3d at 369.
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